



Answering the Challenges of Alwith Systems Engineering



Raytheon Missiles and Defense

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Answering the Challenges of AI with Systems Engineering

Abstract

Al technologies like machine learning and deep neural networks hold great promise for improving, even revolutionizing many application areas and domains. Curiously, experts in Al and casual observers line up on both sides of the "are the benefits worth the risks?" question. Several books from prominent Al researchers paint dire scenarios of AI systems run amok, escaping the control of their human creators and managers, pursuing their "own" agendas to our detriment. At the same time, AI research races ahead, developing new capabilities and far surpassing the performance of past systems and even humans—so how can we resist these advancements and the benefits they bring, even though there may be risks?

The way out of the dilemma is the application of systems engineering. Systems engineers have been addressing the issues of dangerous technologies for decades. Nuclear fission, like AI is an inherently dangerous technology. Systems engineers can't make fission safer, so instead they build systems around the fission reaction, making the entire system as safe as possible. If a system fails, the fault is not with fission, but with the design or implementation of the system.

This presentation surveys some of the main challenges in the development of intelligent systems—systems that include one or more Al-based components to produce intelligent behavior—including reliability, safety, dependability, explainability and susceptibility to interference or hacking. Some recent Al failures will be used as case studies to highlight how systems enginéering methods and techniques could be used or adapted to solve Al challenges.



Avoiding the "End Scenario"







A Framework for Thinking about Al Systems



The Human Analogy

How would we train, manage, monitor and correct a human assigned the same task?



The Systems Analogy

How do we (or would we) manage the inherent risk and danger of a valuable but dangerous technology?




I. Killer Robots

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- The "SkyNet" problem: what if an Al suddenly "wakes up" and discovers that it is **conscious**, selfaware, rational and motivated toward new (evil) objectives it has created for itself?
- An Al over-interpreting or misinterpreting human-given objectives is a different problem
- Remember, Als are not mysterious alien beings—we build them!

- Human Analogy
 - How do we prevent a human from doing this? Or how do we compensate/respond?
- System Analogy
 - How do we prevent a nuclear missile from doing this?





II. Safety of a single AI system



- "Most robot-related incidents thus far have been the result of
 - Machines being too stupid, rather than too smart
 - A disharmonious relationship between man and machine" (Crockett, 2018)
- An Al does what it is designed to do
- Machine learning learns by examples (ONLY!)

Systems Engineering: FMEA/FMECA Failure Mode Effects Analysis

- Alternative to break/fix cycle
- Proactively identify potential causes of failures by asking "what if?"
- "What if the Al-based temperature prediction algorithm starts predicting



super high (impossible indoor) temperatures?"




III. You can't really test an Al because it is inscrutable



Systems Engineering Verification: does the system meet the requirements?

- Traditional systems allow both black and white box testing and verification
- White box perspective of deep neural network does not easily reveal how it makes decisions—it's just numbers
- Human analogy: testing by cases, scenarios, situations – use cases!

- Use Case: a sequence of events, representing a complete usage of a system, yielding a result of value
- Test Case = Use Case + test data
- Test using realistic scenarios
- How much testing is enough?






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IV. You can't trust an Al because it is unpredictable



SE Validation: does the system serve its intended purpose?

- Validation is performed by humans: requires "face time" with the system
- Trust grows with time, repetition, experience, credibility
- One intelligent machine working with another, building trust





Applying the human analogy: how do you validate an unpredictable human user?



V. Als are dangerous because they get things Raytheon Technologies



Data Requirements: The Green School Bus Problem

Al image recognition is taught to identify military vehicles and differentiate civilian



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Now, into the field of view wanders this:




How do you think it will be classified? If it is selected as a target, is the Al to blame?

Training Data and the Lifecycle



- Apply systems development lifecycle to Data used in training
- Requirements / Planning
 - What data is needed
- Analysis
 - Coverage, negative examples, adversarial, edge cases, bias in data
- Design of Data
 - How to use the data
 - Augment, Synthesize
- Implementation



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VI. Als are prone to mysterious, unfair and worrisome biases




Systems Thinking: use an unreal world to counter bias

- Bias in the world vs. bias in the data Application: identify male nurses and female nurses in photos
- In the world: 93% of nurses are female
- Should data consist of 93% female nurse photos?
- A "real world" dataset might misclassify men as doctors
- Better dataset would be 50/50



Al bias may come not from OUR biases, but from our poor training





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
VI: With Als, complex systems become too complex to design, operate or trust



Systems Engineering:

Applying Systems of Systems

- How to understand systems with multiple Al-based or intelligent components?
- Conventional models may not be adequate
 - Function, protocol, signal, event
 - Data flow
 - Operations in object oriented classes/blocks
- Human analogy: Al components are decision makers who "weigh in" on decisions



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Applying Causal Loop Diagrams to Al Systems




Think influence and contribution, not calculation

VI. Killer Robots: Policing the Rogue Machine Technologies

- Applying Systems Thinking
- Human Analogy: how do we prevent humans from committing murder?
 - We DON'T! Not 100%
- We have a system that all together helps to prevent (too much) murder
 - Laws
 - Police
 - Detectives
 - Courts
 - Prisons
- Als will serve these functions for other Als society is a system





Forensic Science Lab (7969822920).jpg.CC

VII. Als are too complex to model



Model Based Systems Engineering is an approach to modeling complex systems

- Using models to analyze understand and communicate behavior and structure of a system
- Treat AI components like functions, with input and output
 - Predict rainfall tomorrow from past data
 - Generate a response to a customer's question
 - Classify an image as containing enemy tank, or not
- Reason about functionality assigned to Al-component





Convenient design or asking for trouble?

If you don't want the AI to fire the missile, don't put the "fire" button within its reach!



Conclusion



- Als exist in a system, just like people
- Systems engineering can be used on that system
- Plan and design for failures and problems
- Consider the human analogy
- Consider the past systems analogy

THE SYSTEM IS ALWAYS WORKING

